Abstract. We present a novel, simple technique for proving secrecy properties for security protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length, for an unbounded number of sessions. More specifically, our technique relies on the Horn clause approach used in the automatic verifier ProVerif: we show that if a protocol is proven secure by our technique with lists of length one, then it is secure for lists of unbounded length. Interestingly, this theorem relies on approximations made by our verification technique: in general, secrecy for lists of length one does not imply secrecy for lists of unbounded length. Our result can be used in particular to prove secrecy properties for group protocols with an unbounded number of participants and for some XML protocols (web services) with ProVerif.
Introduction
Security protocols are protocols that rely on cryptographic primitives such as encryption and signatures for securing communication between several parties. They aim at ensuring security properties such as secrecy or authentication. Historically, attacks were often found against protocols that were thought correct. Furthermore, security flaws cannot be detected by testing since they appear only in the presence of an attacker. The confidence in these protocols can then be increased by a formal analysis that proves the desired security properties. To ease formal verification, one often uses the symbolic, so-called Dolev-Yao model [8] , which abstracts from the details of cryptographic primitives and considers messages as terms. In this work, we also rely on this model.
The formal verification of security protocols with fixed-size data structures has been extensively studied. However, the formal verification of protocols that manipulate more complex data structures, such as lists, has been less studied and presents additional difficulties: these complex data structures add another cause of undecidability.
In this work, we present a technique for proving secrecy properties for security protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length. This technique is based on the Horn clause approach used in the automatic verifier ProVerif [1, 4] . ProVerif is an automatic protocol verifier that takes as input a protocol, translates it into a representation in Horn clauses, and uses a resolution algorithm to determine whether a fact is derivable from the clauses. One can then infer hal-00863387, version 1 -18 Sep 2013 Author manuscript, published in "First Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12) 7215 (2012) 69--88" security properties of the protocol. For instance, we use a fact att(M ) to mean that the attacker may have the message M . If att(s) is not derivable from the clauses, then s is secret. The main goal of this approach is to prove security properties of protocols without bounding the number of sessions of the protocol.
Like other protocol verifiers, ProVerif can analyze protocols with lists if we fix the lengths of the lists a priori. However, if the protocol is verified only for some lengths, attacks may exist for other values. So our goal is to prove the protocols for lists of any length. To reach this goal, we extend the language of Horn clauses, introducing a new kind of clauses, generalized Horn clauses, to be able to represent lists of any length. We consider a class of protocols that manipulate list elements in a uniform way. Because of this uniformity, one might intuitively think that secrecy for lists of length one implies secrecy for lists of any length. We show that this intuition is not exactly true: in general, secrecy for lists of length one does not imply secrecy for lists of any length, as demonstrated in Sect. 4.2. However, we show that, for a certain class of Horn clauses, if secrecy is proved by our Horn clause technique for lists of length one, then secrecy also holds for lists of unbounded length. This result relies on the sound abstractions made by the translation into Horn clauses. Additionally, we provide an approximation algorithm that can transform generalized Horn clauses into clauses of the class on which our result holds. All facts derivable from the initial clauses are also derivable from the clauses generated by the approximation algorithm, so that we can prove secrecy on the latter clauses, and conclude secrecy for the initial clauses. Our result therefore provides an easy way of obtaining a strong security guarantee: we prove using ProVerif that att(s) is not derivable from the clauses for lists of length one, and we can then immediately conclude that secrecy holds for lists of unbounded length, with an unbounded number of sessions.
Applications of our results include in particular proving secrecy properties for some group protocols that manipulate unbounded lists, with an unbounded number of participants. In this paper, we focus mainly on group protocols and illustrate our work on the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol [2] . We prove secrecy of the session key exchanged in this protocol by verifying with ProVerif its version with lists of length one and the size of the group equal to one. Another possible application is the treatment of XML protocols such as web services, XML documents being modeled using possibly nested lists.
Related Work The first approach considered for proving protocols with recursive data structures was interactive theorem proving: Paulson [17] and Bryans et al [5] study a recursive authentication protocol for an unbounded number of participants, using Isabelle/HOL for [17] , and rank functions and PVS for [5] . However, this approach requires considerable human effort.
Meadows et al [15] used the NRL protocol analyzer (NPA), based on a combination of model checking and theorem-proving techniques, to verify the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol suite. NPA could not handle the infinite data structures required for modeling general group protocols, so a single key was used instead of a key hierarchy. Several problems including type flaw The fact att(p) means that the attacker may have the pattern (message) p. A clause F 1 ∧ · · · ∧ F n ⇒ F means that if all facts F i are true then the conclusion F is also true. We use R for a clause, H for its hypothesis, and C for its conclusion. The hypothesis of a clause is considered as a multiset of facts. A clause with no hypothesis ⇒ F is written simply F .
Cryptographic primitives are represented by functions and perfect cryptography is assumed. There are two kinds of functions: constructors and destructors. A constructor f is a function that explicitly appears in the patterns that represent messages and builds new patterns of the form f (p 1 , . . . , p n ). Destructors manipulate patterns. A destructor g is defined by a set def (g) of rewrite rules of the form g(p 1 , . . . , p n ) → p where p 1 , . . . , p n , p are patterns with only variables and constructors and the variables of p appear in p 1 , . . . , p n . Using constructors and destructors, one can represent data structures and cryptographic operations. For instance, senc(x, y) is the constructor that represents the symmetric key encryption of the message x under the key y. The corresponding destructor sdec(x , y) returns the decryption of x if x is a message encrypted under y. The rewrite rule that defines sdec is
A protocol is represented by three sets of Horn clauses:
1. initial knowledge of the attacker: we have a fact att(p) for each p initially known by the attacker. 2. abilities of the attacker:
-att(a) -for each constructor f of arity n:
hal-00863387, version 1 -18 Sep 2013 ProVerif determines whether att(p) is derivable from the clauses using resolution with free selection [3] : we combine pairs of clauses by resolution; the literals upon which we perform resolution are chosen by a selection function. Next, we define when a given fact is derivable from a given set of clauses.
Definition 1 (Subsumption). We say that R 1 = H 1 ⇒ C 1 subsumes R 2 = H 2 ⇒ C 2 , and we write R 1 R 2 , if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that σC 1 = C 2 and σH 1 ⊆ H 2 (multiset inclusion).
We say that R 1 subsumes R 2 when R 2 can be obtained by adding hypotheses to a particular instance of R 1 . In this case, all facts that can be derived by R 2 can also be derived by R 1 , so R 2 can be eliminated.
Definition 2 (Derivability). Let F be a closed fact, that is, a fact without variable. Let R be a set of clauses. F is derivable from R if and only if there exists a derivation of F from R, that is, a finite tree defined as follows:
1. Its nodes (except the root) are labeled by clauses R ∈ R; 2. Its edges are labeled by closed facts; 3. If the tree contains a node labeled R with one incoming edge labeled by F 0 and n outgoing edges labeled by This definition is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In a derivation, if there is a node labeled by R with one incoming edge labeled by F 0 and n outgoing edges F 1 , . . . , F n then F 0 can be derived by F 1 , . . . , F n by the clause R. Therefore there exists a derivation of F from R if and only if F can be derived from clauses in R (in classical logic).
Abstract Representation of Protocols by Generalized Horn Clauses
This section is devoted to the abstract representation of protocols by generalized Horn clauses. After introducing a running example and motivating our choices, we give the syntax and semantics of generalized Horn clauses.
Running Example
As a running example, we use a version of the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol [2] for key agreement, also used in [7, 20] . Let the set of players be {a i , i = 1, . . . , N } for N ≥ 1 and L be the leader. The protocol describes the establishment of a session key between the leader and the other N participants.
(
At the beginning, the participants share the knowledge of a password pw and of two N + 1-input hash functions f and h. (In this paper, we ignore dictionary attacks against pw and consider pw as a strong key.) First, the leader sends to all other participants his identity paired with a fresh key e encrypted with the password pw. Each participant a i for i ∈ {1, . . . , N } decrypts {|e|} pw and then creates a fresh key r i and a fresh nonce s i which will be his contribution to the final session key. Then he sends {|(r i , s i )|} e paired with his identity. When L receives this message, he decrypts it and assumes that it has been created by a i . After receiving all N messages, the leader creates his contribution s to the final key and sends to each participant a i for i ∈ {1, . . . , N } the list of all contributions encrypted with the key r i that a i previously sent. If step 3 is completed successfully, each participant can compute the session key K = f (s 1 , . . . , s N , s ). In the end, the leader randomly picks one of the other players and asks him for step 4.
Need for Generalizing Horn Clauses
We would like to model the example protocol of Sect. 
where senc is the encryption function. We solve those two problems by adding two new constructs to the syntax of Horn clauses:
. . , p N (inspired by the mpair construct of [7] ) and i1≤N ,...,i h ≤N F for the conjunction of facts F with indices i 1 , . . . , i h in {1, . . . , N }.
Syntax
This section formally defines the syntax and semantics of generalized Horn clauses. The syntax of these new clauses is defined in Fig. 3 . The patterns p In the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol, we can write, for example, at message 3: senc((list(j ≤ N , s j ), s ), r i ) for senc((s 1 , . . . , s N , s ), r i ). The last element s
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is not included in the list list(j ≤ N , s j ), to distinguish s that has just been created by the leader from s i with i = 1, . . . , N that has just been received by him: s 1 , . . . , s N are treated in a uniform way while s is treated differently.
We extend facts to model the possibility of having a conjunction of facts depending on indices, so that the syntax for facts becomes i1≤M1,..
The conclusion of a clause does not contain a conjunction i1≤M1,...,i h ≤M h : we can simply leave the indices of att(p G ) free to mean that att(p G ) can be concluded for any value of these indices.
Representation of the Protocol
The representation of the abilities of the attacker includes the clauses given in Sect. 2. For our running example, att(a i ) and att(L) represent that the attacker initially knows a i and L, and the clauses att(a)
represent that the attacker can create fresh names, encrypt and decrypt messages, apply hash functions, compose and decompose pairs. In addition, we have clauses for list, which generalize clauses for pairs:
Let us now give the clauses that represent the protocol itself. We suppose that each principal always plays the same role in the protocol; we could build a more complex model in which the same principal can play several roles by adding clauses. The leader L sends the first message (L, {|e|} pw ) and the attacker intercepts it, so we have the fact: att((L, senc(e, pw))). 
For the output of message 3, the leader replies with {|(w 1 , . . . , w N , s )|} vi where s is a fresh name generated by L modeled as a function of the previously received messages s [v 1 , w 1 , . . . , v N , w N ]: the clause (1) was already given in Sect. 3.2; we adapt it using list and conjunctions over the set of participants:
Finally, if a i has received a message 1 of the form (L, {|y|} pw ) and a message 3 of the form
and one a i sends to the leader message 4:
We want to prove the secrecy of the session key K. However, this key depends on data received by protocol participants, so we cannot simply test the derivability of att(K). We can use the following trick: to test the secrecy of the key K that participant a i has, we consider that a i sends the encryption {|s |} K of a secret s under K. If K is secret, the adversary will not be able to decrypt the message, so s will remain secret. Therefore, we add the clause
to model the output of {|s |} K , and we test the derivability of att(s ). We have also used a similar clause to prove the secrecy of the key K that L has.
Type System for the New Clauses
In Fig. 4 , we define a simple type system for the generalized Horn clauses. The goal of this type system is to guarantee that all variables use indices that vary in the appropriate interval. We shall see in Sect. 4 that this type system is also very helpful in order to establish our main result.
Definition 3. An index i is bound if:
-it appears as an index of a conjunction defining a fact, so, for instance, in the fact i1≤M1,..
Indices that are not bound are free.
For simplicity, we suppose that the bound indices of clauses have pairwise distinct names, and names distinct from the names of free indices. This can easily be guaranteed by renaming the bound indices if needed.
In the type system, the type environment Γ is a list of type declarations:
, that is, intuitively, the value of index i can vary between 1 and the value of the bound M .
The type system defines the judgments: 
hal-00863387, version 1 -18 Sep 2013
Most type rules are straightforward. For instance, the rule (Var) means that x i1,...,i h is well typed when the types expected by x for its indices match the types of i 1 , . . . , i h . The rule (Name) deserves an additional explanation: we have no information in Γ to set the type of the index of name a, and hence the index of a can have any type. A priori, it is obviously expected that the index of a certain name a always has the same type. However, the additional freedom given by the type rule will be useful in the rest of the paper: the transformations of Sect. 5 can create clauses in which the same name a has indices of different types. The formal meaning of such clauses can be defined by assuming that the name a exists for indices up to the value of the largest bound.
It is easy to verify that the clauses of Sect. 3.4 are well typed in our type system. Clause (2) The syntax of Horn clauses obtained by translation of generalized Horn clauses is given in Fig. 5 . This syntax is similar to that of initial Horn clauses (Fig. 1) except that variables and names can now have indices ı, which are integer values, and that we include a pattern p 1 , . . . , p h for representing lists (which will be generated by translation of list).
Translation from Generalized Horn Clauses to Horn Clauses
A generalized Horn clause represents several Horn clauses: for each value of the bounds M and of the free indices i that occur in a generalized HornR ::= F 1 ∧ . . . ∧ F n ⇒ F Horn clauses
Definition 4. Given a generalized Horn clause R
G well typed in Γ , an environment T for R G is a function that associates to each bound M a fixed integer M T and to each free index i that appears in
Given an environment T and values ı 1 , . . . , ı h , we write T [i 1 → ı 1 , . . . , i h → ı h ] for the environment that associates to indices i 1 , . . . , i h the values ı 1 , . . . , ı h respectively and that maps all other indices as in T .
Given an environment T , a generalized Horn clause R G is translated into the standard Horn clause R GT defined next. We denote respectively p GT , F GT , . . . the translation of p G , F G , . . . using the environment T . The translation of a pattern p G is defined as follows:
The translation of list is a list; we stress that this translation uses a list symbol . . . different from the tuple symbol (. . .): list is the only construct that can introduce the list symbol . . . . This is important to make sure that confusions between tuples that may occur in the protocol and list do not occur for particular list lengths. In the implementation of the protocol, one must also make sure to use distinct encodings for list and for tuples. The translation of a fact
Finally, we define the translation of the generalized Horn clause
. For instance, the translation of the clause (5) in the environment T = {N → 1, i → 1} is att ((a 1 , senc((v 1 , w 1 ), e))) ⇒ att(senc (( w 1 , s [ (v 1 , w 1 ) ]), v 1 ) ).
When R G is a set of generalized Horn clauses, we define
In terms of abstract interpretation, the sets of generalized Horn clauses ordered by inclusion constitute the abstract domain, the sets of Horn clauses ordered by inclusion the concrete domain, and R GT is the concretization of R G . The set R GT includes clauses translated for any values of the bounds. In our running example, for instance, this allows one to consider several sessions of the protocol that have different group sizes N , and interactions between such sessions.
From Any Length to Length One
In this section, we define a mapping from lists of any length to lists of length one, and show that derivability for lists of any length implies derivability for lists of length one, for a particular class of Horn clauses.
Main Result
Given a generalized Horn clause R G , there exists only one environment T for R G such that all bounds are equal to 1. Hence by now we use R G1 for the only
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possible translation of R G when all bounds are 1. We define R G1 = {R G1 | R G ∈ R G }. Next, we define a translation from clauses in which bounds can have any value, following the syntax of Fig. 5 , to clauses in which the bounds are fixed to 1:
This translation maps all indices of variables and names to 1. The translation of a list is a list with one element, containing the translation of any element of the initial list. Several choices are possible for the translation of a list; I(p) returns the set of all possible patterns. Given a fact F = att(p), its translation when the bounds are fixed to 1 is I(att(p)) = {att(p) | p ∈ I(p)} Given a conjunction of facts F 1 ∧ · · · ∧ F h , its translation when the bounds are fixed to 1 is I(
We say that a term or fact is linear when it contains at most one occurrence of each variable x (with any indices, so it cannot contain x i and x j for instance). Finally, we can state the main theorem of our paper: Theorem 1. Let R G be a set of generalized Horn clauses such that, for each clause R G ∈ R G , R G is well typed, that is, there exists Γ such that Γ R G , with the following conditions:
1. the free indices of R G have pairwise distinct types in Γ ; 2. the conclusion of R G is linear and the bound indices in the conclusion of R G have pairwise distinct bounds, and bounds different from the bounds of free indices of R G in Γ .
For all facts F , if F is derivable from R GT , then for all F ∈ I(F ), F is derivable from R G1 .
If we show that, for some F ∈ I(F ), F is not derivable from R G1 , then using this theorem, F is not derivable from R GT . Suppose that we want to show that s is secret in a protocol represented by the clauses R G . We show using for instance ProVerif that att(s) is not derivable from R G1 , that is, we prove secrecy when the bounds are all fixed to 1. By Theorem 1, we conclude that att(s) is not derivable from R GT , so we obtain secrecy for any bounds. Unfortunately, this theorem does not apply to all Horn clauses: Hypotheses 1 and 2 have to be satisfied. The clauses of our running example do not satisfy these hypotheses. We shall see in Sect. 5 how to transform the clauses so that they satisfy the required hypotheses.
Examples
To illustrate why the hypotheses of the theorem are necessary, we provide examples for which the theorem does not hold because some hypotheses are not satisfied. Consider the following protocol: a 1 , a 1 ), . . . , f (a 1 , a N ) , . . . , f (a N , a 1 ), . . . , f (a N , a N ) At the beginning, the participants A, B, C share a key k. A first sends to B a fresh nonce a paired with itself and encrypted under k. When B receives it, he creates a fresh nonce b, computes the hash f (a, b) and sends the pair ,b) , and obtain s, but an adversary should be unable to compute s. In the second part of the protocol (Messages 3 and 4), A sends to C a list of N fresh pairs (a i , a i ) encrypted with k and C replies with the matrix of the hashes f (a i , a j ). Now, if an attacker sends {(a, a)} k , {(b, b)} k to C as Message 3, he obtains f (a, b) by decomposition of the list f (a, a), f (a, b) , f (b, a), f (b, b) and can now decrypt {s} f (a,b) and obtain the secret s.
However, if we consider only lists of one element, there is no attack: the last message consists of f (a, a ) if Message 3 was {(a, a )} k , so the adversary would need to have {(a, b)} k in order to obtain f (a, b).
The generalized Horn clause for Message 4 is:
In this clause, the Hypothesis 2 of Theorem 1 is not satisfied, because the bound indices i and j have the same bound N . If we translate this clause for lists of one element, we obtain
and with this clause (and other clauses representing this protocol), att(s) is not derivable because att(f (a, b)) is not derivable, while with lists of length two, as we previously showed, there is an attack: att(s) is derivable. This example confirms that bound indices in the conclusion must have pairwise distinct bounds. Similarly, we can define a group protocol between a participant B, a leader L, and N group members A i :
In this case, the generalized Horn clause for Message 4 is:
hal-00863387, version 1 -18 Sep 2013
where again the Hypothesis 2 of Theorem 1 is not satisfied: the bound index j has the same bound N as the free index i, because they index the same variable x . As above, att(s) is derivable from the clauses for lists of length 2 but not for lists of length one. There are similar examples regarding Hypothesis 1, for instance with the clause att(list (i ≤ N, senc((x i , y i ), p) )) ⇒ att(f (x j , y i )) in which the free indices i and j have the same type [1, N ], but it is more difficult to find a concrete protocol that would generate such a clause. (Typically, the protocol participants are indexed by a single index i, so clauses often have a single free index.) Next, we consider a different kind of example: for the following protocol, the set of Horn clauses satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 1, so we can apply the theorem. However, the protocol preserves secrecy for lists of length one but not for lists of unbounded length. This illustrates that the approximations made in the translation to Horn clauses are key for our theorem to hold: att(s) is derivable from the clauses, even for lists of length one. Let A and B be the two participants of the protocol that share a key k. Let h be a hash function.
A chooses a fresh key e and two random nonces b 1 , b 2 , and sends to B the message {e} k , (b 1 , b 2 ), {s} h({b1}e,{b2}e) where s is a secret. B obtains e by decryption, computes the key h({b 1 } e , {b 2 } e ), and obtains s by decrypting with this key. Later, B sends a list x 1 , . . . , x M and A returns that list with all components encrypted under e. Clearly, if we consider this protocol for lists of length M ≥ 2, there is an attack: the attacker can send to A the list b 1 , b 2 , . . . and he obtains at Message 3 the list {b 1 } e , {b 2 } e , {. . . } e . He can then compute the hash h({b 1 } e , {b 2 } e ) and decrypt {s} h({b1}e,{b2}e) to obtain the secret s. However, if we translate this protocol to lists of length one, we do not find the attack: the attacker can only ask for {b 1 } e or {b 2 } e , but cannot obtain both. For this point to hold, it is important that the participants do not repeat the Messages 2-3 more than once for each session.
ProVerif finds an attack against this protocol (which is a false attack for lists of length one): the abstraction done with the representation by Horn clauses in fact allows the participants to repeat their messages more than once. The translation of the protocol into clauses for lists of length one contains:
A sends the first message:
A receives message 2 and sends message 3:
plus clauses for tuples, encryption, and the hash function h, where · is a unary function such that att( x ) ⇒ att(x) and att(x) ⇒ att( x ). Now, if we query for the secrecy of s, ProVerif will find the attack: att(s) is derivable from these clauses. Indeed, we get b 1 and b 2 from (7), then obtain senc(b 1 , e) and senc(b 2 , e) by two applications of (8) (note that we apply this clause twice for the same e, while the corresponding action can in fact be applied only once in the protocol itself), then compute h(senc(b 1 , e), senc(b 2 , e)), and finally obtain s by decrypting senc(s, h(senc(b 1 , e), senc(b 2 , e))).
Proof of Theorem 1
This section sketches the proof of Theorem 1. Lemmas and details of the proof can be found in Appendix A. The proof proceeds by building a derivation of F from R G1 , from a derivation of F from R GT , by induction on this derivation. Informally, the derivation of F from R G1 is obtained by applying I to the deriva-
GT by a substitution σ: F = σC GT ; we show that any F ∈ I(F ) is an instance of C G1 by a substitution σ obtained from σ(Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 in appendix) : F = σ C G1 . Hence, in order to derive F using R G1 = H G1 ⇒ C G1 , we need to derive σ H G1 from R G1 , knowing a derivation of σH GT from R GT . Informally, to show that this is possible, we prove that σ H G1 ⊆ I(σH GT ) (Lemma 3 and Corollary 2 in appendix) and conclude by induction.
An Approximation Algorithm
In Sect. 3.4, we gave the representation of the Asokan-Ginzboorg protocol with generalized Horn clauses. However, some of them do not satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 1. For example, the clause (6) does not have a linear conclusion and the same bound appears twice in the conclusion.
Approximation Algorithm
Here we give an algorithm for transforming generalized Horn clauses into clauses that satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem 1. We suppose that the initial set of clauses R G satisfies:
and each variable has indices of pairwise distinct types, that is, if
This hypothesis on the initial clauses is often satisfied in practice. In particular, it is satisfied by our running example, and it should generally be satisfied by group protocols. Indeed, the variables typically have only one index (the number of the group member).
Given a clause R G well typed in Γ , the approximation algorithm performs the following three steps, until it reaches a fixpoint: 
where: -ρ is a substitution that replaces each variable x of H G 1 and p
. . , h} with a fresh variable y (the indices remain the same); the obtained clause will be typed in an environment Γ obtained from Γ by adding 
where
by replacing each occurence of x with y (the indices remain the same), and p G is obtained from p G by replacing one occurrence of x with y .
Step 1 is applied first, until it cannot be applied. Then step 2 is applied, until there are no list constructors that match the condition.
Step 2 may already rename some variables that occur more than once in the conclusion of the clause. Then, when a fixpoint is reached with step 2, we start applying step 3, until no variable occurs more than once in the conclusion.
Step 1 ensures that free indices have pairwise distinct types and that free indices of the hypothesis have types distinct from those of bound indices in the conclusion.
Step 2 ensures that the bound indices in the conclusion have pairwise distinct bounds and bounds distinct from the bounds of free indices in the conclusion.
Step 3 ensures that the conclusion is linear.
This algorithm is similar to the algorithm that transforms any Horn clauses into Horn clauses of the class H 1 [10] . Both algorithms ensure the linearity of the conclusion in the same way (step 3).
Step 2 uses an idea similar to step 3 to guarantee that the types of the indices are distinct.
We illustrate this algorithm on an example below. The next theorem shows its correctness. Its proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Let R G be a set of clauses that satisfies Hypothesis 1. The approximation algorithm terminates on R G and the final set of clauses R G satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 1. Moreover, for any fact F , if F is derivable from R GT , then F is also derivable from R GT .
Examples
We apply the approximation algorithm to our running example. For instance, let us transform the clause (6):
First, as there are two list constructors with the same bound N in the conclusion, we apply step 2 of the algorithm: we rename the bound and variables of one of the two occurrences of list(j ≤ N , z j ) in the conclusion, so we obtain:
Next, as variable z appears twice in the conclusion, we apply step 3 and obtain:
Finally, this clause satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 1. All clauses R G given in Sect. 3.4, which represent our running example, can be transformed in a similar way, yielding clauses R G . We have then shown that att(s) is not derivable from R G1 , using ProVerif with the input file given at http://www.di.ens. fr/~paiola/publications/PaiolaBlanchetPOST12.html. By Theorem 1, we conclude that att(s) is not derivable from R GT , so by Theorem 2, att(s) is not
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derivable from R GT . Therefore, the Azokan-Ginzboorg protocol preserves the secrecy of s, that is, it preserves the secrecy of the key K that a i has. We have shown in a similar way that it preserves the secrecy of the key K that L has.
We have also considered a basic XML encryption [9] protocol. It is a very simple protocol between two principals A and B that share an encryption key k and a MAC key k . In order to encrypt a list a 1 , . . . , a M using the encryptthen-MAC scheme, one encrypts each component of the list, and computes a MAC of the list of ciphertexts:
We have used ProVerif to show that att(a 1 ) is not derivable from the set of Horn clauses for the protocol with lists of length one. Therefore, this protocol preserves the secrecy of each a j , for j = 1, . . . , M .
Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed a new type of clauses, generalized Horn clauses, useful to represent protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length, as well as group protocols with an unbounded number of participants. We have shown that, for a subclass of generalized Horn clauses, if secrecy is proved by the Horn clause technique for lists of length one, then we have secrecy for lists of any length. We have also provided an approximation algorithm that transforms a set of generalized Horn clauses for satisfying the hypothesis of our main theorem. Using these results, one can prove secrecy for lists of any length for some group protocols, as we did for the Azokan-Ginzboorg protocol, and for simple XML protocols.
Future work includes supporting more general data structures and protocols, including more realistic XML protocols (web services). This will probably require a new extension of Horn clauses and of the resolution algorithm, since these protocols may not fit in a class for which secrecy for lists of any length can be proved from underivability for lists of length one. In particular, as we mentioned in Sect. 3.4, our technique does not support equality tests on certain components of lists, because in the representation of unbounded lists, all elements need to have the same form. We plan to support such tests in the future. Moreover, some group protocols (e.g. A.GDH-2) use the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, which we cannot handle yet. We believe that it could be handled by combining our result with [12] .
ProVerif supports a variant of the applied pi calculus for modeling protocols. However, our result models group protocols with generalized Horn clauses. We plan to extend the input language of ProVerif to model group protocols, and to translate it automatically to generalized Horn clauses.
Finally, we plan to consider other security properties, such as authentication, perhaps using lists of length two instead of one. Inductive step: Let the derivation of F be as in Fig. 7 . By definition of a derivation, we have that R GT F 1 ∧ · · · ∧ F m ⇒ F , which means that there exists a substitution σ such that σC GT = F and σH GT ⊆ F 1 ∧ · · · ∧ F m , and F 1 , . . . , F m are derivable from R GT by subtrees of the derivation of F . By hypothesis, we have that
have that σ C C GT = F , Γ C G and hypotheses 1 and 2, so by Corollary 1, for each F ∈ I(F ), there exist τ C consistent with T for Γ C G and σ C ∈ I Γ,τ C (σ C ) such that σ C C G1 = F . Now, we build a τ that extends τ C to Types(Γ R G ) and a σ ∈ I Γ,τ (σ) that extends σ C . For each type [ 
We have F i ∈ I(σF
GT i
). Since σF
⊆ σH GT ⊆ F 1 ∧ · · · ∧ F m , we have F i ∈ I(F * i ) for some F * i ∈ {F 1 , . . . , F m }. So for each i = 1, . . . , k, F * i is derivable from R GT by subtrees of the initial derivation of F , hence by induction hypothesis, F i is derivable from R G1 . Therefore, F is derivable from R G1 by the derivation of Fig. 8 .
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof (of Theorem 2). First, if a generalized Horn clause R G is well typed in Γ , then there exists Γ such that the clause R G obtained by the approximation algorithm is well typed in Γ . Let us construct such a Γ .
-If R G is transformed by step 1, then Γ is equal to Γ except that the type of i is replaced with i : [1, M ] , and for each variable x that occurs in R Let us show that the algorithm terminates. With step 1, we strictly decrease the number of pairs of indices (i, j) such that i is free in the hypothesis, Γ i :
